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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1889, the Supreme Court recognized Congress’s plenary power
to regulate immigration.1 In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), which Congress has continually revised subject to
the political and economic norms of the period.2 The INA is a highly
technical statute and its provisions have prompted much litigation. According to one judge, immigration cases make up forty-six percent of the
Ninth Circuit’s workload.3 Through the INA, “Congress has developed a
complex scheme governing admission to our nation and status within our
borders,”4 which has led to the present intricate and changeable nature of
immigration law.5
In addition to its complexities, immigration law may result in severe consequences that oftentimes exceed the punishments in criminal
law. While being present in the United States without permission is not a
“crime,”6 a removal order often triggers greater hardship than a criminal
sentence. Families are separated, lives are dismantled, and frequently, the
* J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2013; B.A., Political Science, Colorado College,
2007. I would like to thank Manuel Rios, Matt Adams, Daniel Lee, Valerie Balch, Miles Dudley,
and Laura Turczanski for all their help and patience.
1. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604–06 (1889).
2. See Gabrielle M. Buckley, Immigration and Nationality, 32 INT’L LAW 471, 471 (1998).
3. In 2007, Judge Carlos T. Bea remarked that “[i]n the Ninth Circuit, I think . . . [immigration
appeals] are up to forty-six percent of our cases.” Judge Carlos T. Bea, Ninth Circuit, Debate at the
2007 National Lawyers Convention: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of Law (Nov. 16, 2007),
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/immigrati on-amnesty-and-the-rule-of-lawevent-audiovideo.
4. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding
that the determination of a right to remain in the United States required a complex legal analysis
involving multiple federal statutes, prior court decisions, adjudicatory bodies, appeals, and exceptions); Won Kidane, Immigration Law as Contract Law, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 889, 889 (2011)
(“[I]mmigration law is a conundrum of a sort—very difficult to teach to law students, let alone explain to the ordinary migrant new to the American legal system.”).
6. Conversely, crossing a U.S. border illegally is a misdemeanor. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325; Plyer,
457 U.S. at 205 (“Unsanctioned entry into the United States is a crime . . . .”).
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deportee is not permitted to return to the United States.7 The Supreme
Court has “long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe penalty,”8 and there are a string of Supreme Court and circuit court decisions
affirming the criminal and punitive nature of deportation.9
Regardless, deportation is not a criminal punishment, but a “civil
sanction.”10 The civil nature of immigration proceedings means that various constitutional protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial
are absent in a removal hearing.11 This includes the Constitution’s absolute prohibition against ex post facto laws—laws that apply retroactively.12 The Constitution’s bar on ex post facto laws and the presumption
against retroactive legislation are rooted in Supreme Court jurisprudence.13 It reflects a basic notion of fairness that individuals will not be
punished for relying on prior legislative acts, that they will have an opportunity to know what the law is, and that they will have the ability to
conform their conduct accordingly.14 A presumption against retroactive
legislation exists in the civil setting as well, but varying exceptions and
Supreme Court inconsistencies and discrepancies make this area of law
unpredictable.15 The technical complexities, the conflicting agency and
7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). Deportees remain unable to return to the U.S. either permanently, or in some instances, until a certain amount of time has elapsed, for example, five, ten, or
twenty years. Id.
8. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding that “deportation is an integral part of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants
who plead guilty to specified crimes”).
9. See, e.g., Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642–43 (1954) (“Although not penal in character, deportation statutes as a practical matter may inflict ‘the equivalent of banishment or exile,’ . . .
and should be strictly construed.”); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (reading a deportation statute narrowly “because deportation is a drastic measure”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135, 154 (1945). Additionally, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) significantly expanded
its criminal enforcement policies in the past decade. See Peter R. Moyers, Butchering Statutes: The
Postville Raid and the Misinterpretation of Federal Criminal Law, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651, 653
(2009).
10. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation proceeding is a
purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry
. . . .”).
11. There are various substantive and procedural safeguards mandated in criminal proceedings
that are not required for immigration proceedings, including the right to a government-appointed
lawyer, prohibitions on ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, and cruel and unusual punishment, the
guarantee of a jury trial, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612–17 (1960); Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 726 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Jan.
7, 2009) (“The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal cases does not
apply because removal proceedings are civil.”), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (Bd. of Immigration
Appeals June 3, 2009).
12. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 389 (1798).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”).
14. See generally Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
15. See generally Pamela J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance and
Stare Decisis, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515, 1565 (1998).
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circuit court decisions, and the punitive nature of deportation make retroactivity within immigration law even more convoluted.
A hypothetical may help demonstrate the unique dangers that detrimental reliance and conflicting rules of law pose in the immigration
context: a Mexican couple and their ten-year-old child cross the border
illegally near the Tijuana San Ysidro port of entry and begin living in
Los Angeles. Because the boy entered illegally, the INA prohibits the
child from legalizing his status through most immigrant or nonimmigrant visa processes within the U.S.16 For twelve years the boy
works illegally, saves money, and avoids detection. Then, Congress
passes a law allowing certain aliens to apply for a waiver and adjust their
status without having to return to their country of origin. The statute is
ambiguous as to whether aliens, who entered illegally, may also apply
for the waiver to adjust their status. The issue goes to the Ninth Circuit
and the court rules that the waiver does apply to aliens who entered illegally. After this rule of law is announced, the boy comes out of hiding,
hires an immigration attorney, pays the application fee of over $1,000, a
fine of $1,000, and a waiver fee of over $500, and applies to adjust his
status to that of a Legal Permanent Resident based on the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling.
Meanwhile, the agency in charge of executing immigration laws,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), reviews the Ninth Circuit decision and issues a conflicting opinion that the waiver does not apply to
aliens who entered illegally. Five years after its original decision, the
Ninth Circuit revisits the issue and, based on principles of agency deference, gives effect to the BIA’s interpretation. Meanwhile, the agency
already accepted the boy’s application fees, but never adjudicated the
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). To be eligible for adjustment of status, the immigrant must be
“admitted or paroled,” meaning the boy must have entered the U.S. through a valid point of entry
and presented himself to a Customs and Border Patrol agent. Id. To gain an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, the boy must depart from the U.S. and attempt to obtain the requisite visa at a U.S.
consulate in Mexico. See Consular Processing, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
http://uscis.gov (last visited Sept. 4 2012) (follow “Green Card” hyperlink; then “Green Card Processes and Procedures” hyperlink). But when the boy leaves the United States he becomes automatically inadmissible by virtue of his unlawful presence in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(9)(B)(i). To return to the U.S., the boy must not only be eligible for a visa, but now that he
is inadmissible, he must illustrate that the denial of his visa will result in extreme hardship—
hardship beyond the norm—to his parents or wife, assuming that they have Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) or United States Citizenship (USC) status. See id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). If the boy’s spouse
or parent is not an LPR or USC, then the boy cannot return for ten years. See id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i).
If his parent or spouse has the requisite status, but cannot illustrate that they would suffer hardship
beyond what is normally suffered from separation, then the boy cannot return for ten years. See id.
While the United States Citizen and Immigration Services reviews the application for a visa and
waiver for unlawful presence, which can last from a few months to a few years, the boy must remain
in Mexico.
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application during the five-year period when the controlling interpretation of the law was in his favor. After the subsequent conflicting Ninth
Circuit decision, the agency denies the boy’s application and instead
places him in removal proceedings.
In the five years that passed between the Ninth Circuit’s two conflicting opinions, a great number17 of individuals, like the boy, relied on
the prior ruling, came out of hiding, spent their life savings on immigration attorneys and fees, and were then placed into removal proceedings
after the agency accepted their applications and fees, then denied the applications based on the Court’s subsequent decision. By applying the
Ninth Circuit’s decision retroactively, the boy and potentially hundreds
of similarly situated individuals will be removed to their country of
origin after acting to their detriment, by paying the thousands of dollars
in application fees to the government and coming out of the shadows, in
reliance on a previously announced rule of law. The potential unfairness
of the retroactive application of law is manifest and contrary to “familiar
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.”18
This hypothetical is based on Gonzales v. U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (Duran Gonzales), which, at the time of writing this
Comment, is pending petition for rehearing en banc at the Ninth Circuit.19 The Ninth Circuit first reheard Duran Gonzales in light of another
recent Ninth Circuit decision, Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, but the three judge
panel of Duran Gonzales III ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s action on
October 25, 2011, applying the previously announced rule of law retroactively.20 Plaintiffs then filed for a petition for rehearing en banc on December 9, 2011.21 Nunez-Reyes, an en banc decision, addressed the question of when the court may apply a new rule of law to past events in the
immigration context.22 While factually distinct from Duran Gonzales,

17. The plaintiffs in Duran Gonzales,alleged that there were hundreds of prospective class
members who filed applied for I-212 waivers in reliance on the rule announced in Perez-Gonzalez v.
Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004). See Gonzales v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 239 F.R.D.
620 (W.D. Wash. 2006), vacated and remanded, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007).
18. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994) (considering whether section 102
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be applied retroactively).
19. Gonzales v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Duran Gonzales II), 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.
2007); see also Duran Gonzales v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Duran Gonzales III), 659 F.3d
930, 932 (9th Cir. 2011). For a discussion of the complex procedural history of Duran Gonzales, see
infra Parts V and VI.
20. Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d at 939.
21. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930 (No. 09-35174), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Duran-petition-rehearing-en-bancfinal.pdf.
22. Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 691–94 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Nunez-Reyes applied a new rule of law to aliens prospectively only and,
importantly, required the use of a test laid out in the Supreme Court’s
decision Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.23 The Chevron Oil test weighs reliance interests when deciding whether or not to apply an agency decision
retroactively.24 The Ninth Circuit’s decision to use the Chevron Oil test
to assess retroactivity is significant because, for the first time, circuit
courts are recognizing that immigration cases do not fit squarely within
the traditional civil context. Due to the very high stakes involved in immigration proceedings, upsetting reasonable, settled expectations based
on the law in place at the time may result in severe consequences that
transcend criminal punishment.25
Using Duran Gonzales as an example, this Comment discusses how
courts determine when and if conflicting rules of law should be applied
retroactively to aliens. Specifically, it argues that the holding in NunezReyes and its use of the Chevron Oil test should be applied broadly to
limit the retroactive application of law in certain immigration cases. Part
II of this Comment gives a brief overview of Supreme Court retroactivity
jurisprudence, the discretionary application of adjudicative retroactivity
as described in Chevron Oil, and the Court’s recent shift toward a more
conservative approach. Part III discusses how administrative law affects
that framework and how courts apply it after the Supreme Court, in
Chevron USA26 and Brand X,27 adopted a policy of extreme agency deference.28 Part IV discusses the Ninth Circuit’s Nunez-Reyes decision.
Part V traces the complex procedural and factual history of Duran Gonzales as well as the Ninth Circuit and BIA cases surrounding it. Part VI
discusses the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision of Duran Gonzales III and
explains why it failed to apply Nunez-Reyes appropriately. Finally, Part
VII offers a brief conclusion.

23. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
24. Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 690.
25. See, e.g., Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating
that deportation is a “penalty,” “a drastic measure,” “and at times the equivalent of banishment or
exile”); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (noting that deportation may result in “loss
. . . of all that makes life worth living”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)
(Brewer, J., dissenting) (“[T]o be forcibly taken away from home and family and friends and business and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and oftentimes most
severe and cruel.”).
26. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
27. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
28. A full analysis of the Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence and the interplay of
agency law is beyond the scope of this Comment. For example, this Comment does not focus on the
difference between primary and secondary retroactivity, the distinction between selective and pure
retroactivity, or the specific constitutional limitations on retroactivity, nor does it examine in detail
when courts do and do not defer to agency interpretation.
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II. OVERVIEW OF CIVIL RETROACTIVITY
Retroactivity has a tortured history in the Supreme Court. Traditionally, the Court has distinguished between retroactive legislation by
Congress and retroactive adjudication by the judiciary.29 An assumption
exists that statutes operate prospectively, while court decisions may apply retroactively to the parties under direct review.30 Put simply, while
Congress cannot create new laws that presently penalize prior conduct,
judges may, through adjudication, issue decisions that affect previous
behavior. While the origin of the doctrine traces back to the writing of
the Constitution,31 it was not formulated until a series of criminal law
decisions in the 1960s.32 Due to similar concerns of finality, fairness,
reliance, and stare decisis, retroactivity presents a similar problem in
both criminal and civil contexts.33
The first court to part with the traditional rule of retroactive application was Linkletter v. Walker, a criminal case decided in 1965, which
held that a subsequent adjudication is subject to no set “principle of absolute retroactive invalidity” but instead that there are cases where the interests of justice make the rule prospective.34 Thus, a determination of
retroactivity depends on “weighing the merits and demerits in each
case.”35
Since Linkletter, the traditional rules for both civil retroactive legislation and adjudication began to erode. The Supreme Court formulated
new tests that involved increased levels of judicial discretion in both areas. In the legislative context, the Court remained faithful to the principle
that retroactive legislation is unjust, subject to few exceptions.36 Conversely, adjudicative retroactivity has grown more complex and contra29. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
30. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311−12 (1994) (“The principle that
statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to
every law student . . . .”).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”).
32. For an overview of the Warren Court decisions, see Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the
Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1 (2002).
33. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994) (“[W]hile the constitutional impediments to retroactive civil legislation are now modest, prospectivity remains the appropriate default
rule.”).
34. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965). For a more complete explanation of
Linkletter and its progeny, see Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for
Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 601−04 (2009).
35. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 627.
36. See, e.g., Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 n.15 (1974) ( “[T]he effect
of a subsequent ruling of invalidity on a prior final judgment under collateral attack is subject to no
fixed ‘principle of absolute retroactive invalidity’ but depends upon consideration of ‘particular
relations . . . and particular conduct.’”); Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 282–83
(1969).
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dictory in the past forty years. Like Linkletter, the Supreme Court’s earlier cases were rooted in principles of fairness; however, the current state
of the doctrine has been described as “inconsistent,”37 frustrating,38 and
“somewhat chaotic.”39
A. Adjudicative Retroactivity, Chevron Oil v. Huson, and Its Progeny
Generally, adjudicative rules are announced in the case under direct
review. Because pre-existing facts are involved, and because the newly
announced judicial decision applies to those facts, the new rule of law
may apply retroactively to the parties under review.40 The Supreme Court
changed this general rule and developed a discretionary approach to civil-adjudicative retroactivity when it decided Chevron Oil v. Huson in
1971.41
Chevron Oil involved an action brought by the family of a workman injured on an oil drilling rig off the coast of Louisiana.42 Three years
after his injury, and during the discovery phase of the lawsuit, the relevant choice-of-law rule was overruled by Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. through its interpretation of the Lands Act.43 The effect of
Rodrigue was substantial: it shortened the statute of limitations for personal injury cases to one year, and, if applied retroactively to the plaintiff
in Chevron Oil, would have time-barred his claim.44
After discussing prior civil cases, which refused to apply new rules
retroactively, the Chevron Oil Court established a three-factor test to determine when a court’s newly announced rule should only apply prospectively.45 First, the judicial decision must announce a new principle of
37. Stephens, supra note 15, at 1565.
38. William Reed Huguet, Note, Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp.-In Pursuit of A Workable Framework for Adjudicative Retroactivity Analysis in Louisiana, 60 LA. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2000) (“[T]he
temporal effects of judicial decisions continues to frustrate jurists and United States Supreme Court
Justices alike.”).
39. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor described the history of the doctrine:
Three Terms ago, the case of American Trucking . . . produced three opinions, none of
which garnered a majority. One Term later, James B. Beam . . . yielded five opinions;
there, no single writing carried more than three votes. As a result, the Court today finds
itself confronted with such disarray that, rather than relying on precedent, it must resort to
vote counting: examining the various opinions in Jim Beam, it discerns six votes for a
single proposition that, in its view, controls this case.
Id.
40. Harper, 509 U.S. at 86–87.
41. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106–09 (1971).
42. Id. at 98-99.
43. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
44. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 98−99.
45. Id. at 106−07.
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law.46 A new rule is only a “new principle of law” if it overrules past
precedent on which the parties relied, or alternatively, interprets an issue
of first impression, the resolution of which is not obvious.47 Second, the
court “‘weigh[s] the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the
prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether
retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’”48 This factor
looks at the overall policy of the rule and examines whether retroactive
enforcement furthers that policy. Finally, the court considers whether the
decision “could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively.”49 This involves assessing the inequity that is imposed by retroactive application, usually due to good faith reliance on a previous rule of
law.50 For example, because immigration law often concludes in a removal order, the resulting inequity may be substantially higher than it
would otherwise be in a traditional civil setting. Essentially, the threefactor test resembles a traditional balancing-of-equities approach.51
In Chevron Oil, the Supreme Court found that the three factors
weighed in favor of applying the new rule only prospectively.52 Rodrigue
was a case of first impression, and because it was decided three years
after the plaintiff’s injury, the Court found that he had relied on the prior
rule, that he could not foresee that it would be overturned, and that applying the new law retroactively would be unfair.53 Additionally, because
the goal of the Lands Act was to provide “comprehensive and familiar
remedies” to individuals like the plaintiff, retroactive application of the
ruling in this case would defeat this purpose by denying the plaintiff a
remedy.54
The Supreme Court strictly adhered to the Chevron Oil test for fifteen years but continues to debate its vitality, making the area of adjudicative retroactivity far from settled.55 The subsequent string of opinions
are confusing and conflicting, and they create a series of complex issues.56 While it appears that subsequent Supreme Court decisions eroded
46. Id. at 106.
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)).
49. Id. at 107 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969)).
50. See id.
51. Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 354 (2003). In this article, Levin provides an overview of a
balancing of the equities approach.
52. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 107.
53. Id. at 107–08.
54. Id. at 108.
55. See generally Stephens, supra note 15.
56. A thorough evaluation of Supreme Court jurisprudence on civil adjudicative retroactivity is
beyond the scope of this Comment. For a full explanation of each case and the varying opinions,
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the importance of the Chevron Oil test,57 it was never expressly overruled.58 Instead, the policy concerns of fairness and reliance, which were
paramount in Chevron Oil, have been replaced by a more “classical”
view that focuses on two primary concerns with prospectivity: (1) that a
prospective application of an adjudicatory rule will result in inequity
among parties; and (2) that prospectivity is a form of “judicial activism.”59
Post-Chevron Oil decisions favored the retroactive application of
law because it was central to the equal treatment of individuals.60 Shifting toward a classical approach, the Court reasoned that fundamental
notions of fairness dictate that similarly situated parties be treated similarly.61 A retroactive application of the decision allows for equality because the new rule applies to all cases and prevents the Court from conferring the new rule in a single case.62 The Court was concerned that if
new rules were applied prospectively to only those who first brought the
issue to a court, those parties would be the only ones to take advantage
of the new rule.63 Importantly, this view is concerned with rules that
might be advantageous, rather than rules that might be punitive.
Also inherent in the classical view are unflinching principles concerning the separation of powers—the Court considered its larger role as
a rule interpreter rather than a rule maker.64 Specifically, Article III of
the Constitution only permits federal courts to hear “cases” or “controversies.”65 Because the judiciary does not have the power to “create” law,
a new rule resolving a specific controversy must be applied to all similar
cases pending on direct review. Therefore, as Justice Scalia noted in
American Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, “prospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to
prescribe what it shall be.”66
doctrines, and principles, see Stephens, supra note 15. See also Meir Katz, Comment, Plainly Not
“Error”: Adjudicative Retroactivity on Direct Review, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1979 (2004).
57. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 87–88 (1993).
58. Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 688–94 (9th Cir. 2011).
59. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993); James B. Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S. 916 (1990); Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
60. See Beam, 501 U.S. at 530.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 540–44 (holding that according to principles of equality and stare decisis, it is
error for a court to refuse to retroactively apply a law when it was applied to the case announcing the
law).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 544.
65. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
66. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In truth, the Court’s asser-
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Justice Scalia’s approach equates prospectivity with “judicial activism” because the law has always been the law, and courts merely state
what it is.67 Prospectivity would create two rules of law where Congress
created one, and judges do not have the power to “create” law in this
manner.68 To avoid judicial activism, this view engages in a “legal fiction” by pretending that the prior judicial interpretation of the law never
existed. Even though there are successive conflicting interpretations of a
statute, the law can only have one true meaning and, therefore, has always “meant” the same thing. The subsequent rule applies retroactively
because that is what the law has always been, even when the subsequent
rule is diametrically opposed to the previous one. This classical approach
denies judges’ status as lawmakers and elevates retroactivity to a constitutional mandate.69
This reasoning was espoused in both James B. Beam Distilling Co.
v. Georgia and Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, yet both cases resulted in multiple opinions and no clear standard. Beam produced
five separate opinions in which, according to Justice Souter, “principles
of equity and stare decisis . . . prevail[] over any claim based on Chevron
Oil analysis.”70 Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and wrote separately to expressly disapprove of the judicial activism inherent in prospective-only application.71 The majority of the opinions did not apply
the Chevron Oil test. Conversely, the dissenters applied Chevron Oil,
argued for prospectivity, and based their opinions on the “potentially
devastating liability without fair warning” for the “blameless” defendants.72
Harper involved retired federal employees attempting to take advantage of a previously announced Supreme Court decision—they
sought refunds for state income taxes and argued that a prior rule should

tion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases . . . that have not already run the full
course of appellate review, is quite simply an assertion that [its] constitutional function is not one of
adjudication but in effect of legislation.”).
67. See Am. Trucking, 496 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Beam, 501 U.S. at 549
(Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that judges have the power “‘to say what the law is,’ not the power to
change it” (citation omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803))).
68. See Beam, 501 U.S. at 550 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Unlike a legislature, we do not
promulgate new rules to ‘be applied prospectively only’ . . . .”); see also Harper v. Va. Dep’t of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 106 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The true traditional view is that prospective decisionmaking is quite incompatible with the judicial power, and that courts have no authority to engage in the practice.”).
69. See generally Harper, 509 U.S. 86.
70. Beam, 501 U.S. at 540.
71. See id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 558 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined
Justice O’Connor’s dissent.
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apply retroactively to them.73 The rule at issue in Harper was benevolent
rather than penal. Relying on Beam, Harper adopted a rule that a new
judicial rule of law will generally be applied retroactively to all cases
pending on direct review, even if events predate or postdate the court’s
announcement of the rule.74 Because the lower court did not apply the
holding to the parties in that case, the Supreme Court reversed.75 Thus, in
cases where the rule has already been retroactively applied to the parties
on direct review, that application trumps Chevron Oil.76 The Court did
not, however, overrule Chevron Oil, nor did it provide further guidance
as to when it should be applied.
Beam, Harper, and other post-Chevron Oil cases disregarded reliance interests and created a presumption of retroactivity. They ignored
the “individual hardships”77 that occur when adjudicative authorities issue contradicting opinions. Specifically, they disregarded “whether [individuals] actually relied on the old rule and how they would suffer from
retroactive application of the new.”78 Equality and principles of separation of powers replaced reliance as the foremost protected value, and reliance was relegated to remedy law.79
Even with the Supreme Court’s shift in policy, its opinions remained fractured: Chevron Oil was never expressly overruled, there is no
clear doctrinal stance on the issue of adjudicative retroactivity, and circuit splits are common.80 Specifically, the Court has never specified
when lower courts may use the Chevron Oil test. Therefore, this Comment argues that because the consequences in immigration law are more
severe than other areas of civil law, courts should apply the Chevron Oil
test in evaluating retroactivity concerns in immigration cases, just as the
Ninth Circuit did in Nunez-Reyes.81
B. A Working Framework in Legislative Retroactivity: Landgraf v. USI
Film Products
In the immigration context, the circuit courts and the BIA are usually the authorities that announce new rules. Certainly, Congress has
amended and promulgated new portions of the INA, but the majority of
73. Harper 509 U.S. at 89−92.
74. Id. at 97.
75. Id. at 97−100.
76. Id. at 98.
77. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987).
78. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543 (1991).
79. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 198 (1990).
80. See generally David N. Mark, Retroactivity of Statute of Limitations Ruling Under the
Influence of Jim Beam, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 361 (1993) (discussing Chevron Oil’s continuing vitality).
81. Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2011).
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the new rules come from administrative and judicial interpretation, rather
than agency rulemaking or congressional enactment.82 Accordingly, this
Comment is largely dedicated to discussing adjudicative retroactivity.
Yet, because the post-Chevron Oil cases are difficult to apply, analyzing
retroactive legislation provides a helpful working framework.
For retroactive legislation, the Supreme Court formulated a clear
framework in a 1994 case, Landgraf v. USI Film Products.83 The
Landgraf Court held that when Congress enacts new legislation, absent
an express prescription of the statute’s reach, courts must determine retroactivity by inquiring “whether it would impair rights a party possessed
when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose
new duties with respect to transactions already completed.”84 The Court
retreated toward its traditional presumption that the statute should not
apply retroactively unless there is a “clear congressional intent favoring
such a result.”85
The Landgraf opinion embodied concerns about notice and fairness
similar to those that animated the Court’s analysis of adjudicative retroactivity in Chevron Oil. The framework weighed fairness concerns along
with legislative objectives and renewed the Court’s hostility toward retroactive legislation.86 While not a bright-line rule, Landgraf provides a
workable framework for lower courts to address retroactive legislation.
Conversely, there is no Supreme Court precedent equivalent to Landgraf
to guide lower courts in addressing adjudicative retroactivity.87
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Montgomery Ward Test
Due to the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in the area of civil retroactive adjudication, the Ninth Circuit adopted its own test in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC in 1982.88 The court adopted a new test that
clarified whether a new agency rule should apply retroactively.89 Under
the Montgomery Ward test, if the agency adopts a new rule, the court
must consider five factors to determine whether the new rule applies retroactively:
82. For a list of laws amending the INA, see Public Laws Amending the INA, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVS., http://uscis.gov (last updated June 2012) (follow “Laws” hyperlink; then “Public
Laws Amending the INA” hyperlink).
83. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
84. Id. at 280.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 265–73.
87. This is primarily the case because of the concerns emphasized in the “classical” approach,
as articulated by Justice Scalia. See supra Part II.A.
88. 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982).
89. Id. at 1333.

2012]

The Revival of Reliance and Prospectivity

257

(1) whether the particular case is one of first impression,
(2) whether the new rule represents an abrupt departure
from well established practice or merely attempts to fill a
void in an unsettle area of law, (3) the extent to which the
party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the
former rule, (4) the degree of the burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory interest
in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the
old standard.90

The factors recognize that the agency has an interest in applying its
decision retroactively; however, those interests are balanced with the
potentially unfair application to the individual.91 Unique to the Montgomery Ward test, in the civil adjudicatory context, is a presumption
against retroactivity and its emphasis on detrimental reliance in deciding
whether to apply a new rule retroactively.92 In the immigration context,
the Ninth Circuit used the Montgomery Ward test several times to prohibit the retroactive application of a newly announced BIA rule.93
Montgomery Ward was the Ninth Circuit’s response to unclear Supreme Court jurisprudence. Both Landgraf and Montgomery Ward
demonstrate that it is necessary to consider reliance interests because the
potential for unfairness is significant. That danger is even greater in immigration cases because of the combination of judicial deference to
agencies and the penal nature of these cases. Agency deference increases
the danger of inequitable retroactive application in two ways. First, it
limits judicial review of agency adjudication. Second, it creates conflicting rules of law between the circuit courts and the agency. The potential
dangers of agency deference are discussed in Part III, which explores the
administrative law decisions affecting retroactivity in the immigration
context.
III. INCREASING AGENCY DEFERENCE: CHEVRON USA AND BRAND X
“The dynamics of the three branches of Government are well understood as a general matter. But the role and position of the agency, and the exact locus of its powers, present questions that are delicate, subtle, and complex.”94

90. Id.
91. Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2007).
92. Great W. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 916 F.2d 1421, 1431 (9th Cir. 1990).
93. See Miguel-Miguel, 500 F.3d at 950−51; Chang v. United States, 327 F.3d 911, 917−18
(9th Cir. 2003).
94. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 536 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Unlike traditional civil and criminal cases, an administrative agency
adjudicates cases based on its own interpretation of the controlling statute. The Supreme Court confronts those statutory issues with the agency’s interpretation in mind. Because of the agency’s expertise in the particular area of law95 and Congress’s decision to provide agencies with the
power to execute the law, courts must acknowledge agencies’ authority
to interpret the statutory scheme at issue.96 In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Chevron USA) the Supreme
Court mandated this congressional deference.97
Chevron USA requires courts to defer to agency interpretation when
the underlying statute is ambiguous. Agency deference, or “Chevron deference,” replaces the de novo judicial review of the agency’s legal conclusions.98 Applying Chevron deference to an ambiguous statute is a twostep test.99 First, the court determines whether the statute’s plain terms
“directly . . . [address] the precise question at issue.”100 If the intent of
Congress is clear, then the court and the agency must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress because an unambiguous
statute “contains no gap for the agency to fill.”101 If the court determines
“Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,” the
court defers to the agency’s interpretation and asks whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.102 If the statute is unclear and the agency’s construction is reasonable, then the court
accepts that construction of the statute.103 This deference reflects the
agency’s expertise and Congress’s allocation of power to the agency to
properly execute the law.104 While there are exceptions to Chevron deference,105 it is a dominating principle in administrative law.
95. See Ryan M. Carson, Note, Chinks in the Armor: Municipal Authority to Enact Shoreline
Permit Moratoria After Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 177, 210−11
(2007) (“Agencies are given deference because it is presumed that some measure of added competence or expertise is present within the agency, more so than the general legislative body.”).
96. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841–42 (1984).
“The adoption of the ‘Chevron doctrine,’ as it is commonly known, has spawned a vast range of
issues for litigation and scholarly commentary.” Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron’s Domain:
Agency Interpretations of Statutory Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 572 (2007)..
97. Chevron USA, 467 U.S. at 841–43.
98. Id. at 842–44.
99. Id. at 842.
100. Id.
101. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005).
102. Chevron USA, 467 U.S. at 843.
103. Id.
104. See generally United States v Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Chevron deference is
especially warranted if the agency’s interpretation involves highly technical policy considerations
that the federal courts have no experience in. Id. As a result, when litigants challenge “the wisdom of
[an] agency’s policy,” rather than its reasonableness under the relevant statute, the challenge must
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The Supreme Court went even further in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, requiring Chevron
deference to agencies’ legal conclusions whenever a circuit court decision conflicted with an agency’s conclusions and those conclusions were
based on an ambiguous statute.106 In Brand X, the Supreme Court deferred to the Federal Communications Commission’s interpretation of a
federal statute even though it conflicted with existing Ninth Circuit precedent.107 Circuit court precedent only controls if it stems from an unambiguous statute,108 but courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that carries the “force of law.”109 Importantly, the order in which courts and agencies construct a statute does
not limit the deferential weight accorded to the agency.110 Thus, when an
agency issues a subsequent opinion and it conflicts with prior circuit
court precedent, the circuit court must overrule its precedent and defer to
the agency’s interpretation. This is because Brand X extends Chevron
deference—even when courts interpret an ambiguous statute before the
agency does.111
The BIA, within the Executive Office for Immigration Review, is
the principal federal administrative agency to which Congress delegated
the authority to adjudicate the INA through the Attorney General and the
Department of Justice.112 Chevron deference applies to the BIA as it interprets the INA—the BIA provides meaning to those provisions of the
INA that are ambiguous.113 Through BIA’s case-by-case adjudication, it

fail: “federal judges–who have no constituency–have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices
made by those who do.” Chevron USA, 467 U.S. at 866.
105. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000) (holding that when agency
actions lack the force of law—such as opinion letters and policy statements—the Circuit Court may
interpret the law de novo because the agency has not been delegated authority to administer it).
106. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83
(2005).
107. Id. at 968–69.
108. Id. at 982.
109. Id. at 982–83. Although the Court did not define “force of law,” the Ninth Circuit subsequently concluded that “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”
Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (deciding whether statutory rape
under § 261.5 of the California Penal Code is sexual abuse of a minor for immigration purposes, but
not applying the Chevron doctrine to the BIA’s interpretation because the BIA’s ruling did not carry
the force of law).
110. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983.
111. Id.
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).
113. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 416 (1999); Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551
F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008).

260

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:245

bridges the INA’s statutory gaps,114 and published decisions by the BIA
meet the “force of law” requirement.115 If a statute is ambiguous, and if
the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron USA requires federal courts to accept the agency’s construction of the statute,
even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the
best statutory interpretation.116 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit must, generally, defer to the BIA’s construction of the INA, even if it believes that
construction to be erroneous.
Judicial deference to the BIA, however, is not always appropriate.
A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute will trump the agency’s
construction if the court decision follows from the unambiguous terms of
the statute.117 If the statute is unambiguous there is no room left for agency discretion.118 Chevron USA established a “presumption that Congress,
when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost,
by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”119 Even though the
court’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute is not authoritative, a different agency construction does not indicate that the court’s holding was
necessarily legally incorrect.120
It is within the agency’s power to choose a different construction of
the statute because it is the authoritative interpreter of such statutes—
within the limits of reason.121 In all other respects, the court’s prior ruling
remains binding law.122 The precedent has not been “reversed” by the
agency any more than a federal court’s interpretation of a state’s law can
be said to have been “reversed” by a state court that adopts a conflicting—yet authoritative—interpretation of state law. In practice, however,
circuit courts will usually reverse a prior position once a subsequent and

114. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 416; see also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982 (“[I]t is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.”).
115. See Renteria-Morales, 551 F.3d at 1081.
116. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984).
117. Id. at 865–66.
118. Id.
119. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740−41 (1996).
120. See Chevron USA, 467 U.S. at 843.
121. Id.
122. Id. For example, the court’s rulings would trump agency interpretations to which Chevron
deference does not apply. Id.

2012]

The Revival of Reliance and Prospectivity

261

conflicting agency interpretation has been issued, and the particular issue
reaches the circuit court in a later case.123
In sum, under the Supreme Court’s Chevron USA and Brand X decisions, the BIA need only issue an opinion that carries the force of
law—making it eligible for Chevron deference—to set aside the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation. Then, under Brand X, circuit courts are forced to
overrule precedent unless they can show that the statute was unambiguous, the ruling did not carry the force of law, or the BIA’s interpretation
was arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.124
This extreme deference to the BIA, coupled with the Supreme
Court’s post-Chevron Oil retroactivity jurisprudence discussed in Part II,
can result in fundamental unfairness when an alien acts in reliance on
prior circuit court precedent that is later supplanted by a new administrative rule, placing the alien in a detrimental position. Aliens rely on valid
circuit court precedent, the court defers to the BIA and changes its rule,
and the court then applies that rule retroactively to those aliens. In 2011,
the Ninth Circuit recognized the inequity that reliance and retroactivity
can have in the immigration arena when it refused to apply a new administrative rule retroactively in Nunez-Reyes v. Holder.125 Part IV of this
Comment traces the Nunez-Reyes decision and its use of Chevron Oil to
alleviate the unfairness of retroactivity in the immigration context.
IV. RELIANCE INTERESTS AND CHEVRON OIL REVIVED: NUNEZ-REYES V.
HOLDER
In deciding Nunez-Reyes, the Ninth Circuit overruled its prior decision in Lujan-Armendariz v. INS.126 Lujan-Armendariz—on the basis of
equal protection theory and the Federal First Offender Act (FFOA)—
provided that a vacated, expunged, or otherwise set-aside state conviction for first time, simple possessory offenses of controlled substances
nullified the effects of the conviction on one’s immigration status.127 It
created an exception to the general rule, applicable only in the Ninth Circuit, that convictions expunged pursuant to state rehabilitative statutes

123. See, e.g., Duran Gonzales II, 508 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the BIA’s
decision In Re Honorio Torres-Garcia precluded the Ninth Circuit’s previous and conflicting construction of an amendment to the INA).
124. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. Derived from the Administrative Procedure Act, the “arbitrary and
capricious standard” is interpreted very narrowly.
125. 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011).
126. Id. at 688; Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000).
127. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 736. For example, a crime of shoplifting, a crime of moral
turpitude making it a deportable offense under the INA, could be waived under the FFOA and the
rule announced in Lujan-Armendariz. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
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would not be given effect.128 Of every circuit court, the Ninth Circuit was
the only one to adopt this interpretation and apply the FFOA to state
convictions.129 Thus, it was only a matter of time before LujanArmendariz would be overturned—the only question was to what extent.
Nunez-Reyes answered that question by overturning Lujan-Armendariz
and holding that the FFOA could no longer be applied to state criminal
convictions.130 But the court found retroactivity concerns with the application of this new rule and specifically limited its decision to apply only
prospectively to aliens convicted after the publication of Nunez-Reyes.131
In finding that the new rule should not be imposed retroactively on
people who had been convicted prior to the new rule being announced,
Nunez-Reyes applied Chevron Oil’s three-factor test.132 The Nunez-Reyes
court, sitting en banc, recognized the complexities of the Supreme
Court’s retroactive adjudicatory jurisprudence and acknowledged that
decisions like Harper and Beam cast doubt on whether the Chevron Oil
test is still good law.133 Nunez-Reyes held that while the “default principle” is to apply the court’s decision retroactively, the court found itself
“bound by Chevron Oil” because “all three of [its] requirements . . . are
met.”134 The court laid out the requirements: (1) a civil case, (2) an announcement of a “new rule of law,” and (3) the new rule’s lack of a relationship to the court’s jurisdiction.135 The new rule must apply to all similarly situated parties, meaning that the court cannot pick and choose to
whom the decision applies prospectively and to whom it applies retroactively.136 If the court does not have the jurisdiction to apply the new law
prospectively, it cannot do so. 137 Because Nunez-Reyes involved a civil
case, where the court announced a new rule of law that did not concern
its jurisdiction, the court applied the Chevron Oil test.138
Finding that Chevron Oil applied, the Nunez-Reyes court then proceeded through the three-step Chevron Oil test to decide if the newly
announced rule should apply retroactively. The first step in the Chevron
128. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 737.
129. See, e.g., Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2003); Vasquez-Velezmoro v. INS,
281 F.3d 693, 695 (8th Cir. 2002).
130. Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 688.
131. Id. at 690.
132. Id. at 691 (“We apply the three-pronged test outlined in Chevron Oil . . . .”).
133. See id. The Nunez-Reyes court noted that, in Harper, “the Supreme Court cast serious
doubt upon the continuing vitality of the Chevron Oil test.” Id. (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 692.
135. Id. at 691.
136. Id. at 690.
137. Id. at 691.
138. Id. at 692 (“In this civil case, we announce a new rule of law that does not concern our
jurisdiction. The Chevron Oil test applies.”).
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Oil test requires that the court announce “a new principle of law.” 139 For
example, under the prior rule in Lujan-Armendariz, aliens pleaded guilty
to certain crimes knowing that their convictions could be expunged and
not affect their immigration status.140 Nunez-Reyes established a new rule
by overruling Lujan-Armendariz, a precedent upon “which previous litigants may have relied.”141 Moreover, in determining whether a court announced a “new principle of law,” the Nunez-Reyes court considered the
clarity of the prior rule and stressed the importance of reliance interests.142 Specifically, the court considered whether aliens would suffer a
penalty if they could not rely on the old rule and whether they could
“make a fully informed decision” based on the conflicting rules of law.143
Because of the consistent application and reliance on the rule in LujanArmendariz, the court found that Nunez-Reyes declared a new principle
of law.144 Importantly, the first step of the Chevron Oil test, as analyzed
by the Nunez-Reyes court, considers retroactivity apart from agency deference. The court did not use Chevron USA or Brand X to defer to the
BIA, but instead focused on reliance interests to determine that a new
rule of law had been announced.145
The court proceeded to the second step of the Chevron Oil test by
considering the “effect and purpose” of the new principle of law and analyzing whether “retroactive operation will further or retard that rule’s
operation.”146 The court acknowledged that while Congress intended
state-law convictions to have adverse immigration consequences, Congress also intended that aliens receive the constitutional protections of
the justice system.147 Under Lujan-Armendariz, aliens could plead to certain categories of offenses before having a jury trial, resulting in the uninformed waiver of their constitutional rights.148 And while the waiver of
one’s constitutional rights was important, the court also held that the retroactive application of the Nunez-Reyes rule would not further immigration laws because “[c]ontrary to their understanding that there would
be no immigration consequences, the actual consequence is the severe
penalty of removal.”149 Thus, because aliens relied on the prior rule, and

139. Id.
140. Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 732-34 (9th Cir. 2000).
141. Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 692 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 693−94.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 694.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 699.
147. Id. at 699–700.
148. See generally Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000).
149. Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 694.
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would be severely penalized because of that good-faith reliance, the resulting inequity is sufficient to retard the rule’s ultimate operation.150
The third step asks whether the application of the new rule “could
produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively.”151 The
court found the facts of Nunez-Reyes “easily” satisfied this step because
of the fundamental unfairness in promising aliens no legal consequences
and then “[holding] retroactively that their convictions actually carried
with them the particularly severe penalty of removal.”152 The court also
cited an Eleventh Circuit case, in which the court determined that “[i]t
would be inequitable to punish those parties for following the clearly
established precedent of this Circuit.”153 Because of the reliance on a
clear precedent, and the severe resulting penalty, the court found that the
respondents satisfied the third step of the Chevron Oil test.154
In analyzing each step of Chevron Oil test, the court focused on the
reliance interests that a retroactive application would affect—interests
that have lain dormant since Chevron Oil. Nunez-Reyes’s emphasis on
reliance issues exemplifies the unique nature of immigration law and
highlights its punitive aspects, which create a greater potential for unfairness. When retroactivity is an issue in an immigration case, it is insufficient to treat it like any other civil or administrative case. The Ninth
Circuit’s application of Chevron Oil is a reaction to the inequity of applying agency deference and retroactivity to aliens that are penalized for
relying on clear precedent. The decision in Nunez-Reyes is a unique doctrinal position that should be broadened and expanded in the immigration
context. Unfortunately, a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit recently narrowed the Nunez-Reyes holding in Duran Gonzales v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Duran Gonzales III).155 Part V of this
Comment will trace the complex procedural history and analysis of Duran Gonzales II and III.
V. DURAN GONZALES V. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY I AND II
This section explains the series of Duran Gonzales cases, the facts
of which are used to set up the hypothetical at the beginning of this
Comment. It will trace the Ninth Circuit’s reaction after the BIA promulgated a conflicting interpretation of an ambiguous immigration statute
150. Id.
151. Id. at 694 (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971)).
152. Id. (citations omitted).
153. Id. (quoting Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 545 (11th Cir.
2002)).
154. Id.
155. 659 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2011).
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and the affect of the retroactive application of that subsequent interpretation on aliens who relied on the prior Ninth Circuit rule.
The statute at issue is the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE)
Act, which was enacted on December 21, 2000, and altered the INA to
allow for certain previously ineligible aliens to remain in the country
while seeking to adjust their own status.156 Section 245(i) of the LIFE
Act was ambiguous as to whether previously deported aliens who subsequently re-entered without inspection could apply for a discretionary
waiver—an “I-212 waiver”—along with their adjustment of status application.157 This ambiguity was of vast importance to a number of aliens,
present in the U.S. illegally, who could not apply for an adjustment of
status (to a Legal Permanent Resident) because they had previously entered without inspection, entered on visas that prohibited adjustment of
status, or overstayed their visas and thus were generally ineligible for
adjustment of status.158 Section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) renders immigrants who
re-enter the U.S. without inspection inadmissible, but permits them to
apply for a waiver once they have remained outside the U.S. for ten
years.159 Thus, for many immigrants, the LIFE Act was an opportunity to
waive their prior re-entry, adjust their status, and remain in the country
legally. Yet, the ambiguity of the LIFE Act opened the door for judicial
and administrative interpretation.
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the task of resolving the
LIFE Act’s ambiguity in Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft.160 The court held
that the LIFE Act did, in fact, waive an alien’s illegal re-entry bar and
allow aliens to adjust their status under § 245(i) if the alien applied for,
and was granted permission to reapply for, admission after deportation
via the discretionary I-212 waiver.161 Significantly, the court expressly
rejected the argument that § 245(i) did not apply to aliens who had reentered without inspection and admission after having been deported.162
Approximately two years later, the BIA issued a conflicting decision. It decided Matter of Torres-Garcia, and disagreed with the conclusion in Perez-Gonzalez by holding that inadmissibility based on §
156. See U.S.C. § 1255(i).
157. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(e). The law states that “an applicant for adjustment of status under
section 245 of the Act and part 245 of this chapter must request permission to reapply for entry in
conjunction with his or her application for adjustment of status . . . by filing an application” for
permission to reapply for an I-212 waiver.” Id.
158. See Gonzales v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 239 F.R.D. 620 (W.D. Wash. 2006), vacated and remanded, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007).
159. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(C)(i).
160. Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004).
161. Id. at 788–92.
162. Id. at 790 (“[Section] 245(i) clearly contemplates that some aliens who have entered the
country without legal admission can receive adjustment of status.”).
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212(a)(9)(C)(i) (re-entry without admission) cannot be cured with a I212 waiver.163 Thus, Torres-Garcia prohibited the filing of I-212 waiver
forms with applications for adjustment of status after removal of the alien and the alien’s re-entrance without being inspected and admitted.
Before the Perez-Gonzalez decision in 2004, the named plaintiffs in
Duran Gonzales had been living illegally without detection.164 While
they had previously been deported, each re-entered the United States
without inspection and remained unlawfully.165 Because of the plaintiffs’
deportation and illegal reentry, they were unable to adjust their statuses
to that of legal permanent residents based on their inadmissibility under §
212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the INA.166 After the Ninth Circuit’s Perez-Gonzalez
decision, the plaintiffs in Duran Gonzales came out of hiding, paid thousands of dollars to immigration attorneys, and in addition, each applicant
paid the government approximately $3,000.167 The plaintiffs submitted
all the proper forms and fees to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for adjudication, and the USCIS accepted the
fees and applications.168
Adjudication of adjustment of status applications can take years to
process. While the plaintiffs’ applications were pending, they appealed
the BIA’s interpretation in Torres-Garcia, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s
Perez-Gonzalez decision. The matter did not reach the Ninth Circuit until
2007, when the Ninth Circuit, in Duran Gonzales II, rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the ambiguous statute should be construed in their

163. Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 866, 876 (BIA Jan. 26, 2006). The BIA held as follows:
As discussed above, 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 does not purport to implement section
212(a)(9)(C)(ii) of the Act. Even if the regulation were applicable, however, we could not
interpret it in a manner that would allow an alien to circumvent the statutory 10-year
limitation on section 212(a)(9)(C)(ii) waivers by simply reentering unlawfully before requesting the waiver. After all, it is the alien’s unlawful reentry without admission that
makes section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) applicable in the first place. . . . We find that the more reasonable interpretation of the statutory framework discussed above is that an alien may not
obtain a waiver of the section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) ground of inadmissibility, retroactively or
prospectively, without regard to the 10-year limitation set forth at section
212(a)(9)(C)(ii).
Id.
164. Duran Gonzales II, 508 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2007).
165. Id.
166. Section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) bars aliens who are deported and illegally re-enter, like the plaintiffs in Duran Gonzales, from being admitted to the U.S. for ten years.
167. To complete the adjustment of status process, immigrants must pay: (1) a $1,000 penalty
to excuse their entry without admission; (2) general form filing fees for the adjustment of status
process amounting to $1,490; and (3) a $585.00 fee to apply for an I-212 waiver that allows immigrants to reapply for admission after having been deported. Forms, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., http://uscis.gov (last visited Sept. 4, 2012) (follow “Forms” hyperlink).
168. See Duran Gonzales II, 508 F.3d at 1231.
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favor, and instead deferred to the BIA’s decision in Torres-Garcia.169
The Ninth Circuit based its decision on the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Brand X and Chevron USA, stating that it would no longer follow the
rule in Perez-Gonzalez and would instead defer to the BIA’s reasonable
interpretation of the statute.170 Importantly, Duran Gonzales II overruled
Perez-Gonzales not because it was an unlawful interpretation of § 245(i),
but because the agency promulgated a contrary interpretation of an ambiguous statute, which the court deferred to under Brand X and Chevron
USA.171 Thus, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Torres-Garcia rule and remanded to the district court pursuant to that decision.172
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Duran Gonzales II was the first decision in the country to use Brand X to defer to an agency’s interpretation
of an ambiguous statute that contradicted a circuit court’s prior interpretation.173 The question remained whether the Ninth Circuit’s overruling
of Perez-Gonzalez in Duran Gonzales II would be retroactively applied
to the plaintiffs, who acted in reliance on the previous rule.174 No court
had addressed a situation where an agency’s new rule conflicted with the
circuit court’s precedent, individuals relied on the new rule, and the circuit court deferred to the agency decision pursuant to Brand X and Chevron USA.175 On remand to the district court, the plaintiffs argued that the
new rule announced in Duran Gonzales II should not apply retroactively,
but the district court never addressed the retroactivity concerns and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.176 The plaintiffs appealed the district
court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit in Duran Gonzales III, stating that
the district court erred in failing to conduct any retroactivity analysis.177
The primary issue in Duran Gonzales III was whether the new rule, an-

169. Id. at 1236 (“Accordingly, Brand X requires us to review our prior opinion in PerezGonzalez in light of the BIA’s subsequent decision in In re Torres-Garcia. If we conclude that Perez-Gonzalez was based, at least in part, on ambiguity in the applicable statutes, then pursuant to
Chevron and Brand X we must give deference to the agency’s resolution of these ambiguities in In
re Torres-Garcia.”)
170. Id. at 1241–42.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1242–43.
173. Id.
174. See Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16, Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930 (9th
Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35174), 2009 WL 3459943. The plaintiffs stated, “[T]he retroactivity question
now presented is whether the new rule should be applied to those class members who had already
filed their applications before the new rule was announced, i.e., in reliance on the old rule under
which they were eligible to have their waiver applications adjudicated.” Id.
175. See id.
176. See Gonzalez v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., No. C06–1411–MJP, 2009 WL 302283
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2009).
177. Id.
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nounced in Duran Gonzales II, should be retroactively applied to the
plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs argued that the district court should have applied either the Ninth Circuit’s Montgomery Ward test, the Landgraf test, or the
Chevron Oil test.178 Conversely, the government relied on recent Supreme Court retroactivity cases, such as Harper and Beam, stating that
there exists a presumption of retroactivity, which disallows the application of Chevron Oil or any other retroactivity test.179
While Duran Gonzales III was pending, another Ninth Circuit panel
issued the decision Morales-Izquierdo v. Department of Homeland Security.180 Morales-Izquierdo applied the Duran Gonzales II rule retroactively to a different plaintiff.181 Similar to the plaintiffs in Duran Gonzales,
the plaintiff in Morales-Izquierdo applied for an I-212 waiver before the
BIA’s Torres-Garcia decision, and argued that the Duran Gonzales II
rule should not apply retroactively.182
The Morales-Izquierdo court refused to apply the Duran Gonzales
rule prospectively because, even though § 245(i) of the LIFE Act was
ambiguous, and the meanings the BIA and the Ninth Circuit ascribed to
the LIFE Act were inherently inapposite, a statute can only have one
meaning and, pursuant to Brand X and Chevron USA, the agency decides
that meaning.183 It adopted the classical approach espoused by Justice
Scalia, which provides that a prospective application would create two
rules from the same single authority—an impermissible form of judicial
activism in which the court would be legislating instead of adjudicating.184 Additionally, because Duran Gonzales II overruled PerezGonzalez pursuant to agency deference, it is not a new rule of law that
would make prospective application impermissible.185 In support of its
conclusion, the court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper, stating that “new judicial decisions interpreting old statutes have long been
applied retroactively to all cases open on direct review, ‘regardless of

178. See Plaintiff’s Reply Brief at 17, Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930 (No. 09-35174), 2009
WL 3459945.
179. See Brief for Defendants-Appellees, Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930 (No. 09-35174),
2009 WL 3459944.
180. Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1086−88.
184. Id. at 1089. “‘[T]he Court’s assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating
cases . . . that have not already run the full course of appellate review, is quite simply an assertion
that our constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation.’” Id. (quoting
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987)).
185. Morales-Izquierdo, 600 F.3d at 1090.
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whether . . . events predate or postdate’ the statute-interpreting decision.”186
Interestingly, shortly after the panel decision of Morales-Izquierdo,
the Ninth Circuit issued its en banc decision, Nunez-Reyes, reviving the
civil retroactivity test from Chevron Oil.187 Accordingly, the Duran Gonzales plaintiffs argued that because of the similar reliance interests present in Nunez-Reyes, the court should not apply the Duran Gonzales II
rule retroactively because the Chevron Oil test applies.188 Plaintiffs emphasized their reliance interests: they had paid a large sum of money for
counsel, immigration fees, and fines, and much worse, they had been
subjected to summary removal and separation from their lawful permanent resident and U.S. citizen families because they had relied on a previously announced Ninth Circuit rule.189
Conversely, the government argued that Morales-Izquierdo held
that the rule announced in Duran Gonzales II applied retroactively to all
cases open on direct review.190 It attempted to limit Nunez-Reyes, stating
that Nunez-Reyes mandates a Chevron Oil test only when an alien waives
his or her constitutional rights.191 Because no constitutional rights were
at stake in Duran Gonzales, the reliance interests were not sufficient to
warrant a prospective application.192 The next Part of this Comment will
explore the Ninth Circuit panel’s decision in Duran Gonzales III, which
downplays reliance interests, narrows Nunez-Reyes, and, ultimately, does
very little to further genuine retroactivity jurisprudence.
VI. DURAN GONZALES III
After the BIA issued its conflicting Torres-Garcia decision, the
Ninth Circuit deferred to the BIA in Duran Gonzales II, then applied that
rule retroactively in Morales-Izquierdo, and issued its en banc decision
in Nunez-Reyes, which revived Chevron Oil in the immigration context.
186. Id. (quoting Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993)).
187. See generally Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011).
188. See Supplemental Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930
(9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35174), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/
files/docs/lac/duran-gonzalez-supplemental-brief-2011-08-24.pdf.
The en banc opinion in Nunez-Reyes makes clear that it was incumbent on the District
Court to engage in a retroactivity analysis to determine whether the new rule announced
in this case should be applied prospectively only. Specifically, Nunez-Reyes clarifies that
the District Court should have applied the three factor test laid out in Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson. . . .
Id. at 3.
189. Id. at 8.
190. Morales-Izquierdo, 600 F.3d at 1088.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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The Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in the area of civil adjudicative
retroactivity gave the Ninth Circuit the opportunity, in deciding Duran
Gonzales III, to create a new guiding principle in this complex area of
immigration law. With the facts in Duran Gonzales, the court could have
extended Nunez-Reyes, mandated the application of Chevron Oil, and
limited the fundamental unfairness that results when the BIA and circuit
courts issue conflicting decisions. Instead, the Duran Gonzales III panel
issued a narrow holding, denied prospective-only application, and did
little to direct future retroactivity concerns.193
After recounting the involved procedural history, the court discussed Morales-Izquierdo and Nunez-Reyes in turn.194 The court reasoned that Nunez-Reyes stood for a presumption of retroactive application, and that if a new rule is to be applied only prospectively, this should
be announced in the decision itself.195 Because Duran Gonzales II did not
expressly limit its holding to prospective application, as the court did in
Nunez-Reyes, the Ninth Circuit could not now limit the holding in this
way.196 Therefore, Duran Gonzales II’s retroactive effect was automatic
as soon as it was published without a prospective-only limitation.197 This,
of course, is the opposite of legislative retroactivity, in which a new statute applies only prospectively unless the statute contains a clear mandate
of retroactivity.198
Regardless, the court held that Duran Gonzales II was not silent as
to retroactivity because the final paragraph stated, “[P]laintiffs as a matter of law are not eligible to adjust their status because they are ineligible
to receive I–212 waivers.”199 Essentially, the court relied on the rule from
Harper, which states that a new judicial rule of law applies retroactively
to the parties on direct review.200 By stating that the plaintiffs are ineligible, Duran Gonzales II automatically applied the rule retroactively to the
plaintiffs. But there is a stark contrast between the plaintiffs in Harper,
who were attempting to take advantage of a change in the law, and the
plaintiffs in Duran Gonzales, who are being punished for it.
Finally, the court determined that “our opinion in Morales–
Izquierdo, . . . held that Duran Gonzales II applies retroactively, and we
are bound by that decision.”201 In sum, the Duran Gonzales III panel lim193. See generally Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2011).
194. Id. at 933-39.
195. Id. at 938-39.
196. Id. at 939.
197. Id.
198. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 244 (1994).
199. Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d at 934.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 939.
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ited its analysis to constraining external factors. It skirted the retroactivity issues recently revived in Nunez-Reyes and instead focused on circumspect stare decisis concerns, stating that “because we determine that we
cannot retroactively revise Duran Gonzales II to have only prospective
application, we need not determine whether we would limit Duran Gonzales II to prospective application if we could.”202 Because MoralesIzquierdo expressly applied the new rule retroactively, and because Duran Gonzales II applied its new rule to the plaintiffs, the court was bound
by those decisions.203 In so holding, the Duran Gonzales III panel made
several errors in its analysis.
First, the court incorrectly concluded that it was bound by MoralesIzquierdo instead of Nunez-Reyes. The subsequent en banc decision of
Nunez-Reyes mandated the application of Chevron Oil when there is a
new rule of law announced in a civil case that does not concern a court’s
jurisdiction.204 Thus, Morales-Izquierdo conflicted with Nunez-Reyes in
holding that when an agency rule is adopted pursuant to Brand X, it must
be applied retroactively.205 Because the cases conflicted on this point and
the reasoning in Morales-Izquierdo was superseded by Nunez-Reyes, Duran Gonzales III was incorrect in relying on Morales-Izquierdo when
that authority is irreconcilable with Nunez-Reyes.206
Further, the court erred in stating that a decision to apply the new
rule prospectively must be announced in the decision itself. The court
reasoned that because Duran Gonzales II did not consider the application
of the Chevron Oil factors, it precluded the possibility of doing so subsequently.207 But a host of lower courts have applied Chevron Oil after an
appellate court reversed precedent without deciding the retroactivity issue.208 Moreover, Nunez-Reyes never stated that a prospective-only ruling must be announced at the time the new rule is announced.
The bulk of the court’s reasoning for affirming Morales-Izquierdo
and rejecting Nunez-Reyes and Chevron Oil is relies on the Supreme
Court’s recent cases discussing civil-adjudicative retroactivity such as
Harper, Beam, and Rivers v. Roadway Express. As noted in Part II, these
cases use a “legal fiction” to preclude prospective-only application of
202. Id. at 940.
203. Id.
204. Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2011).
205. Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010).
206. See Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010, 1019 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that where
the reasoning of a prior authority is irreconcilable with the reasoning of an intervening higher authority, a panel is bound by the intervening higher authority).
207. Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d at 938−39.
208. See, e.g., Shah v. Pan Am. World Servs., Inc., 148 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 1998); Holt v.
Shalala, 35 F.3d 376, 380 (9th Cir. 1994); B.B. ex rel. J.B. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 2d
1042, 1049–50 (D. Haw. 2006); Carrol v. Sullivan, 802 F. Supp. 295, 303 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
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adjudicatory rules. This “fiction” is that when there are two conflicting
judicial constructions of a statute, the court will treat the subsequent interpretation as if it was the original and only interpretation. Rather than
treating the two conflicting rules as separate (and applying them as such),
the court pretends that the first rule never existed. The Supreme Court
reasoned that to do otherwise would create two rules when Congress has
only promulgated one, turning the judiciary into legislative “activists”
rather than passive interpreters.
While this reasoning may be effective in traditional civil adjudicatory cases, it does not take into account Brand X, where the agency’s interpretation prevails, and the unique concerns of immigration law, where
reliance interests result in severe consequences. Brand X holds that the
agency is the “authoritative interpreter . . . of such statutes,” and this extreme deference generates conflicting rules of law between the agency
(BIA) and circuit courts.209 Aliens that put faith in the prior circuit court
rules can be deported because they relied in good faith on a binding, published rule of law that was then changed pursuant to Brand X. Thus, this
“legal fiction” of treating the conflicting rules equally, which was only
recently espoused by the Supreme Court, is especially pernicious because
it causes fundamental inequities and has disastrous consequences for
immigrants.
Finally, and most importantly, the court erred in limiting the application of Nunez-Reyes. Nunez-Reyes recognized the inequity of retroactivity in cases applying Brand X, and decided that the Chevron Oil test
was necessary to alleviate that unfairness. But the Duran Gonzales III
court chose to narrow the Nunez-Reyes decision by stating that the reliance issues there were more significant because they rose to the level of
waiving one’s constitutional right:
[T]he situation in Nunez–Reyes is distinct from that presented in this
appeal. In Nunez–Reyes, the petitioner and others similarly situated
waived constitutional rights in reliance on our prior opinion. . . .
Here, the Plaintiffs, in relying on Perez–Gonzalez, did not waive
any constitutional right, although they did disclose to the government their illegal presence within the country. Whatever weight
might be given to such reliance, it is considerably less than that given to the waiver of a constitutional right.210

Yet, Nunez-Reyes never limited its holding to cases in which constitutional rights were at stake. As discussed in Part IV, the fact that the
respondents in that case would be waiving their right to a jury trial was
209. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005).
210. Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d at 940–41.
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neither a threshold requirement for whether the Chevron Oil test applied,
nor a necessary reliance interest. The constitutional right, the waiver of a
jury trial, was discussed only after the court decided that the test should
apply. And even though the respondents would have waived a constitutional right in reliance on the prior rule, making their case stronger, it
was never a requirement that constitutional rights be at stake. The threat
of removal may be an even more convincing reliance interest. Moreover,
the application of Chevron Oil has never required a constitutional right.
Indeed, Chevron Oil was not a constitutional challenge, but a question of
statutory interpretation.211
Therefore, the Duran Gonzales III court erred in not binding itself
to the holding in Nunez-Reyes. Had it done so, the court would have concluded that because Duran Gonzales involved a civil case in which the
court announced a new rule of law that did not concern its jurisdiction,
the Chevron Oil test applied. Given the strength of the reliance interests
in that case, it is unlikely that the court would then have applied Duran
Gonzales II retroactively to the plaintiffs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Duran Gonzales III’s reasoning is flawed in several respects, and
more importantly, it is a step backward from addressing the important
issues that Nunez-Reyes attempted to alleviate. The Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Nunez-Reyes and Duran Gonzales III reflect the same conflicting
principles in the Supreme Court’s adjudicative retroactivity jurisprudence. Nunez-Reyes is a return to Chevron Oil’s reliance-based principles, while Duran Gonzales III affirms the reasoning in MoralesIzquierdo that “when a court interprets a statute, even an ambiguous one,
and even when that interpretation conflicts with the court’s own prior
interpretation, the new interpretation is treated as the statute’s one-andonly meaning.”212 Where Nunez-Reyes elevated reliance principles, Duran Gonzales III distinguished and narrowed them. Given the Supreme
Court’s incoherent jurisprudence on the subject, it is not surprising that
the Ninth Circuit is struggling to produce a clear consensus. This Comment argues that it should favor the principles of reliance to create a clear
driving principle in the immigration context.
This argument is furthered by the administrative law principles discussed in Chevron USA and Brand X. Under Brand X, the court in Duran
Gonzales II was obligated to adopt the agency’s new rule. When courts
are required to reverse precedent based on a conflicting agency rule,
211. See generally Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
212. Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010).
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principles of fundamental fairness inherent in this country’s Constitution,
weigh against applying that rule retroactively.213 Brand X’s effects cannot be overstated. That decision will continue to create the same issues
present in Duran Gonzales. 214 The Ninth Circuit, the circuit that handles
the most immigration appeals in the country, should generate a guiding
principle that reflects the inequity of retroactivity in immigration law. It
began with Nunez-Reyes and the application of Chevron Oil, and it
should rehear Duran Gonzales III, en banc, and extend the Nunez-Reyes
holding in that case.

213. Id.
214. See Plaintiff’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Duran Gonzales III, 659 F.3d 930
(No. 09-35174), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Duranpetition-rehearing-en-banc-final.pdf.

